Army - DoW Travel Pay - DTS
High-priority program
Program level Payment Integrity results
Sponsoring agency: Department of War
PROGRAM METRICS
$2,193 M
in FY 2026 outlays, with a
85.6%
payment accuracy rate
-
Improper payment estimates over time
View as:
Chart toggle amounts:Proper paymentsOverpaymentUnderpaymentTechnically improperUnknown
Payment Integrity results
-
FY 2026 improper payment estimates
Chart legend and breakdown
Payment accuracy rate
Improper payment rate
Unknown payment rate
Sampling & estimation methodology details
Sampling timeframe:
07/2025 - 06/2026
Confidence interval:
90% to <95%
Margin of error:
+/-1.78
Causes
A separate, but equally critical, issue is the high volume of "unknown" payments, which total over $120 million year-to-date. The root cause for this is a fundamental breakdown in pre-payment internal controls, specifically the failure of certifying officers to verify that required supporting documentation, such as receipts, is attached to travel vouchers before approval. According to the Corrective Action Plan, this procedural failure, where vouchers are marked "pay ready" without mandatory receipts, is the principal driver of unknown payments. According to PIIA guidelines, a payment that cannot be substantiated with documentation is classified as an improper payment, even if the payment was otherwise valid.
These two primary issues are exacerbated by systemic and data-related problems. The DTS system itself lacks hard-coded controls or hard-stop edits to prevent the submission and approval of vouchers that are missing mandatory documentation or contain clear calculation errors; the system currently provides only soft warnings that can be bypassed. This technological gap enables persistent human non-compliance. Furthermore, a lack of seamless data integration between DTS and systems that house source documents like travel authorizations frequently results in incomplete records. This makes it impossible for post-payment auditors to verify the legality and accuracy of payments, thus categorizing them as "unknown."
| Overpayment root cause | Overpayment amount |
|---|---|
| Amount of overpayments within the agency's control | $116.8 M |
| Amount of overpayments outside the agency's control | $0.0 M |
| Amount of overpayments that occurred because the data/information needed to validate payment accuracy prior to making a payment does not exist | $0.0 M |
| Amount of overpayments that occurred because of an inability to access the data/information needed to validate payment accuracy prior to making a payment | $0.0 M |
| Amount of overpayments that occurred because of a failure to access data/information needed to validate payment accuracy prior to making a payment | $116.8 M |
| Underpayment root cause | Underpayment amount |
|---|---|
| Amount of underpayments | $6.5 M |
| The amount of underpayments that occurred because the data/information needed to validate payment accuracy prior to making a payment does not exist | $0.0 M |
| The amount of underpayments that occurred because of an inability to access the data/information needed to validate payment accuracy prior to making a payment | $0.0 M |
| The amount of underpayments that occurred because of a failure to access data/information needed to validate payment accuracy prior to making a payment | $6.5 M |
| The amount of improper payments that were paid to the right recipient for the correct amount but were considered technically improper because of failure to follow statute or regulation | $71.3 M |
| The amount that could either be proper or improper but the agency is unable to determine whether it was proper or improper as a result of insufficient or lack of documentation | $120.3 M |
Prevention
To address the over $116 million in monetary losses, the Army is launching a parallel effort focused on a deep-dive analysis of the highest-dollar error categories. A joint Army-DFAS working group will conduct a Monetary Loss Root Cause Analysis, with a report due by November 30, 2026. This analysis will identify the specific drivers of overpayments for meals, lodging, and other expenses. Following this, by January 15, 2027, the team will map the entire end-to-end process for establishing and collecting debts from these overpayments. The findings will be used to develop a list of targeted corrective actions to streamline and enforce collections, which will be documented by March 31, 2027.
To ensure sustained oversight for both unknown payments and monetary losses, the Army will utilize the monthly DFAS Post Pay PIIA DTS Travel Customer Update meeting, starting in October 2026. This forum will provide command leadership with direct, monthly feedback on their specific PIIA sampling error lists from DFAS, creating a continuous loop of correction and accountability. The overall Corrective Action Plan is set for full implementation by September 30, 2027, with the Army projecting it will achieve full PIIA compliance by successfully executing these targeted actions.
The corrective actions detailed in the Army's plan are precisely scaled to address the magnitude and nature of the improper and unknown payments, which total over $314 million year-to-date. The plan establishes two distinct lines of effort, each proportional to the massive financial impact of its target. For the more than $116 million in Monetary Loss - actual lost taxpayer funds which reclassified the program as an OMB High-Priority Program - the response is an intensive, deep-dive root cause analysis by a joint Army-DFAS working group. This action is proportional because it dedicates significant analytic resources to dissecting the highest-dollar error categories, ensuring that subsequent, high-cost corrective actions are targeted to the precise drivers of these financial losses.
To combat the over $120 million in "unknown" payments stemming from a breakdown in pre-payment document verification, the Army is leveraging its formal Risk Management and Internal Control (RMIC) framework. This response is appropriately severe, moving beyond failed training initiatives to create an enforceable, commander-led compliance regime. Mandating that commands perform and report on internal control testing directly ties the procedural failure to leadership accountability and their annual Statement of Assurance. Using this high-level compliance tool is a proportional response to a systemic process failure that has persisted for years and accounts for nearly half of the program's total error amount.
Ultimately, the dual-track strategy is proportional because it avoids a one-size-fits-all solution. Instead, it applies targeted, high-impact enforcement and analysis directly against the two primary root causes - process breakdowns leading to unknown payments and failed validation leading to monetary loss. By dedicating focused, high-level attention to each of these $100+ million problems, the Army’s planned actions are commensurate with the severity of the financial and compliance risks they are designed to mitigate.
These actions are sharply focused on the root causes of the payment errors. To combat unknown payments, which stem from a failure to verify documentation, the plan mandates RMIC testing of the specific voucher review controls (P2P-TOP-002 and P2P-TOP-009). This moves beyond failed training initiatives and forces commanders to inspect the exact point of procedural failure. The adequacy of these actions is rooted in this shift to an enforceable accountability model. The monthly DFAS-hosted Customer Update (CUP) meeting, now attended by G8 leadership and LDTAs from all Army Commands and overseen by the CAP Action Officer, serves as a continuous feedback loop. In these meetings, commands are confronted with their specific transaction-level error lists, creating immediate and sustained pressure to resolve issues.
The anticipated outcome is a significant reduction in improper and unknown payments. The core of the strategy is to make compliance a command-level responsibility with tangible consequences. When commanders understand that failing to enforce receipt verification will result in a formal, system-logged deficiency in eGRC that requires quarterly explanations to HQDA, their compliance is expected to rise sharply. This enforcement mechanism provides the "teeth" that previous efforts lacked and is designed to be adequate to drive the improper payment rate below the statutory 10% threshold by the target compliance date of September 30, 2027.
| Payment type | Mitigation strategies taken | Mitigation strategies planned |
|---|---|---|
| Overpayments | Training | Change Process, Training |
| Underpayments | Training | Change Process |
| Technically improper payments | Training | Change Process |
| Unknown payments | Training | Change Process |
| Eligibility element/information needed | Description of the eligbility element/information |
|---|---|
| Address/location | Information regarding where the applicant/recipient lived, owned property, or was physically present in a specific location |
Additional information
After two consecutive years of non-compliance and facing over $314 million in improper and unknown travel payments, the Army is undertaking a fundamental strategic pivot in its approach to payment integrity. Recognizing that previous efforts focused on training and guidance were insufficient, the Army is now implementing a robust, dual-track accountability framework that addresses the distinct causes of these payment errors. This new strategy is designed to enforce discipline, hold leaders accountable, and restore the public's trust in the Army's fiscal stewardship.
The first track directly targets over $116 million in direct monetary losses - actual lost taxpayer funds - by establishing a joint Army-DFAS working group to conduct a deep-dive analysis of the highest-dollar error categories. This data-driven approach will identify the specific drivers of overpayments and develop targeted actions to improve debt collection and prevent future losses. The second, parallel track confronts the more than $120 million in "unknown" payments by integrating payment integrity into the Army's formal Risk Management and Internal Control (RMIC) program. This elevates the issue to a command-level responsibility, where a failure to ensure proper documentation will trigger formal, reportable deficiencies that directly impact leadership evaluations.
This shift from encouraging compliance to enforcing it demonstrates a serious commitment to resolving this long-standing issue. By making commanders directly responsible for the procedural discipline of their subordinates, the Army is ensuring that the failure to safeguard taxpayer funds has direct and visible consequences. This comprehensive strategy, which holds personnel at every level accountable, represents a new and aggressive chapter in the Army's commitment to sound financial management.
Reduction target
9.9 %The Army has determined that while its human capital is sufficient, its existing internal controls and information systems are not fully adequate to cost-effectively reduce improper payments without significant changes in enforcement. The root cause of improper payments is not a lack of personnel, but a systemic failure of certifying officers to enforce existing pre-payment verification controls. Therefore, the corrective action plan focuses on making the existing human capital accountable through the Risk Management and Internal Control (RMIC) framework rather than pursuing costly new hiring or training initiatives.
The Defense Travel System (DTS) has been identified as a systemic weakness because it lacks hard-coded controls to prevent the processing of incomplete vouchers, a key driver of the over $120 million in "unknown" payments. However, the current strategy prioritizes enforcing procedural compliance as a more cost-effective immediate solution than a major, expensive system redesign. By leveraging the existing RMIC infrastructure to create commander-led accountability, the Army believes it can enforce compliance with existing policies, thereby reducing the error rate below the cost-benefit threshold without significant new expenditures.
The Army did not submit a dedicated budget request in its most recent budget submission to establish or maintain payment integrity. Existing program resources are sufficient to support payment integrity activities, including maintaining internal controls and monitoring improper and unknown payment rates at or below established tolerable levels.
The Department of War (DoW) is actively integrating artificial intelligence (AI) and automation into its financial management (FM) practices to achieve an unmodified audit opinion. Disparate FM systems will be unified in a single, AI-powered source of truth. It will utilize AI agents to enable real-time monitoring, automated system-to-system reconciliations, and an auditable trail. Through this new capability and additional software, the DoW will address pervasive issues for improper pay through rule-based detection, proactive controls, and end to end capabilities.
Accountability for reducing improper payments is being driven from the top down by linking compliance directly to command-level evaluations and performance. Under the new Risk Management and Internal Control (RMIC) framework, DTS improper payments are codified as an official organizational risk. This means that if a command fails its mandatory internal control testing for voucher verification, it will trigger a formal Significant Deficiency or Material Weakness. Command leadership must then report this deficiency quarterly to HQDA and, most importantly, address it in their annual Statement of Assurance—a key component of their performance evaluation. This ensures executive managers are directly accountable for the internal control failures within their organizations.
To change behavior at the transaction level, the plan implements clear ramifications for continued non-compliance by Approving and Certifying Officers. The Army is developing automated procedures to systematically identify officials and travelers associated with improper payments. Once flagged, these individuals will face mandatory remedial actions, which range from targeted refresher training and supervisor notifications for initial infractions to the temporary suspension or permanent removal of their DTS approval authority for repeat offenses. This tiered enforcement strategy ensures that the consequences are proportional to the failure and provides a direct, personal incentive for Certifying Officers to adhere to verification policies, thereby preventing the errors that lead to improper and unknown payments.
Beginning in FY 2026, all agencies must adopt the new Senior Executive Service (SES) performance plans established by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management pursuant to the January 20, 2025, Presidential Memorandum, Restoring Accountability for Career Senior Executives. The highest-weighted element, “Faithful Administration of the Law and the President’s Policies,” reinforces executive accountability for achieving Department of War (DoW) priorities.
Accordingly, SES members responsible for Financial Improvement and Audit Remediation (FIAR) outcomes will include specific, measurable performance requirements aligned with annual financial statement audit priorities. SES members with direct FIAR responsibilities will ensure compliance with applicable policies, maintain effective internal controls and supporting documentation, respond timely to auditor requests, remediate priority material weaknesses, and execute audit roadmaps and corrective action plans supporting an unmodified audit opinion. SES members with indirect responsibilities will implement measurable corrective actions, maintain documentation supporting financial transactions, and ensure personnel are trained and accountable.
These requirements strengthen DoW accountability for audit readiness, payment integrity, efficient operations, and compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act (PIIA).
The DoW Payment Integrity Senior Accountable Officials Steering Committee provides senior-level oversight of these efforts. Chaired by the Office of the Under Secretary of War (Comptroller)/Deputy Chief Financial Officer and co-chaired by the Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service, the Committee monitors improper payment testing, root-cause analysis, recovery activities, audit findings, risk assessments, and corrective actions required under Appendix C of OMB Circular A-123.