Social Security Administration

The most recent Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) annual compliance audit was for fiscal year (FY) 2024. In FY 2024, we had two programs reporting estimates above the statutory threshold, our Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. In the FY 2024 compliance audit, the Social Security OIG concluded the agency was compliant with 8 of 10 PIIA reporting requirements. OIG determined that for the SSI program, the agency did not (1) demonstrate improvements to payment integrity or reach a tolerable improper payment and unknown payment rate and (2) did not report an improper payment and unknown payment estimate of less than 10 percent. The FY 2024 compliance audit report stated, “While SSA has made progress implementing corrective actions for both programs, it still has work to do to address improper payments.”

The FY 2024 compliance audit report included the following recommendation(s) for the agency: 1) Continue working on the recommendations from prior compliance reports, which included: finalize the Improper Payment Alignment Strategies (IPAS) for OASDI computations overpayment deficiency dollars; conduct a study to expand Access to Financial Institutions (AFI) searches between the SSI initial application and subsequent eligibility redeterminations; and complete the expansion study for AFI and assess the effectiveness of lowering the countable liquid resource tolerance to $0; 2) Complete the foreign travel data project; and 3) Finalize the IPAS for relationship and dependency overpayment deficiency dollars.

The reporting period for this data call reflects FY 2025, and whether the agency is compliant will be determined in calendar year 2026. PIIA requires agencies to review and assess all programs with annual outlays greater than $10,000,000 for improper payment risk at least once every three years to identify those susceptible to significant improper payments. Programs that are not likely to have an annual amount of improper payments plus annual unknown payments above the statutory threshold (which is either (a) both 1.5 percent of program outlays and $10,000,000 of all program payments made during the fiscal year, or (b) $100,000,000) are in Phase 1. Beginning in FY 2025, OMB instructed agencies to align improper payment reporting under PIIA one-to-one with programs listed in the Federal Program Inventory. We have three programs in Phase 1: Administrative Payments; Strengthening Protections for Social Security Beneficiaries; and Work Incentives Planning and Assistance Program. During FY 2025, we conducted improper payment risk assessments of our Phase 1 programs. These assessments considered a number of financial statement audits; the size, stability, and complexity of our processes; the historically low error rates; extensive controls inherent in our programs; and the current internal control structure we have in place to prevent, detect, and recover improper grant payments. Our assessments of improper payment risk determined that these programs are not susceptible to significant improper payments and therefore remain in Phase 1. We will conduct improper payment risk assessments for these programs again in FY 2028. If a program in Phase 1 is likely to annually make improper payments and unknown payments above the statutory threshold, then the program will move into Phase 2 the following year. Once in Phase 2 a program will have a different set of requirements such as reporting an annual improper payment and unknown payment estimate. In alignment with programs listed in the Federal Program Inventory, our Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), Disability Insurance (DI), and SSI programs are in Phase 2. We are unable to report OASI improper payments separately by retirement and survivors as we do not sample them independently.

Based on our FY 2024 stewardship reviews (FY 2025 stewardship information will be available in summer 2026), we estimate that we paid approximately $1.4 trillion to OASDI beneficiaries. Of that total, we estimate about $3.0 billion were overpayments, representing approximately 0.21 percent of outlays. We estimate that underpayments during this same period were $975.5 million, the equivalent of approximately 0.07 percent of outlays. In the prior year reporting, based on our FY 2023 stewardship reviews, we estimate that we paid approximately $1.4 trillion to OASDI beneficiaries. Of that total, we estimate about $3.3 billion were overpayments, representing approximately 0.24 percent of outlays. We estimate that underpayments during this same period were $833.4 million, the equivalent of approximately 0.06 percent of outlays. When comparing prior year reporting to this year's reporting, there has been a decrease in estimated overpayments ($3.3 billion to $3.0 billion) and an increase in estimated underpayments ($833.4 million to $975.5 million) in the OASDI program.

We paid approximately $1.3 trillion to OASI beneficiaries. Of that total, we estimate about $1.1 billion were overpayments, representing approximately 0.09 percent of outlays. We estimate that underpayments during this same period were $470.2 million, the equivalent of approximately 0.04 percent of outlays.

We paid approximately $143.4 billion to DI beneficiaries. Of that total, we estimate about $1.8 billion were overpayments, representing approximately 1.28 percent of outlays. We estimate that underpayments during this same period were $505.3 million, the equivalent of approximately 0.35 percent of outlays.

Because this is the agency’s first year reporting improper payments for OASI and DI separately, we do not have comparison data for the prior fiscal year.

OASI and DI overpayments within the agency’s control are due to our failure to access data or information needed to make accurate payments. These overpayments occur when the beneficiary or third-party provided data or information that we requested and was necessary to accurately compute the benefit amount, but we failed to use the data or information needed to validate the payment accuracy prior to making a payment. To prevent these overpayments from occurring, we provide training and reminders for technicians when applicable and develop automation solutions to improve accuracy when possible.

OASI and DI overpayments outside of the agency’s control occur when we are unable to access data needed to validate payment accuracy because the beneficiary or a third-party either did not provide requested information, provided the information after the benefit amount was calculated/processed, or provided inaccurate information necessary to compute the accurate benefit amount. A top cause of these overpayments is our reliance on timely self-reporting of marital status for OASI and employment/wage information for DI. Marital status and child relationship factors are material when determining entitlement to certain auxiliary and survivor benefits. Beneficiary and representative payee failure to report a marital status change was the leading cause of the deficiency dollars in this error category, representing 99 percent of the established errors. To prevent these overpayments from occurring, we conduct outreach. In 2024, we released a public blog on Social Security Matters to educate the public on the importance of reporting these changes. In 2024 and 2025, we aired similar educational information on televisions in Social Security field offices. In April through May 2025, we released social media posts on Facebook and Twitter sharing a link to our YouTube video to help beneficiaries learn about the importance of reporting wages and the automated electronic options for wage reporting. We will continue to find ways to raise awareness and remind the public on the importance of reporting changes. To reduce our reliance on self-reporting and to prevent overpayment of DI benefits related to employment and wages, we began utilizing a new wage reporting option to receive this information from a payroll data provider through an automated payroll information exchange (PIE), which we discuss later in this response. We also use Work Smart, a tool that identifies DI beneficiaries whose earnings put them at risk for being overpaid. Work Smart continues to alert cases for work continuing disability reviews (CDR) based on available earnings data. With the appropriate authorization, Work Smart will utilize PIE data to identify and alert additional cases that may require a work CDR.

In July 2025, we started a national Targeted Work Review Process (TWRP), which leverages the expertise of a cadre of technicians to use readily available earnings data to formulate a proposed work CDR decision prior to requesting a work activity report. Technicians will send both the work activity report and due process notice simultaneously. The TWRP aims to reduce work CDR processing time by allowing one technician to process a case from start to finish and reducing delays in sending/receiving evidence. TWRP continued into early FY 2026, and we plan to evaluate its outcomes later in FY 2026. We will also continue development of a new Electronic Work CDR application to replace and modernize the system technicians use to process work CDRs. The new system will enforce policy and best practices with an intuitive user interface and will eliminate current system limitations that lead to large improper payments through delays and processing errors.

There are some OASI and DI improper payments that have historically been caused by actions both outside of and within agency control. The Social Security Act contained two provisions – the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) and Government Pension Offset (GPO) – that reduced or offset Social Security monthly benefits to beneficiaries who receive a pension based on non-covered earnings. We previously relied on applicants, beneficiaries, or their representative payees to report their entitlement to current or future non-covered pensions; however, they did not always report the receipt of or changes to a pension, resulting in benefit calculation and payment errors. WEP and GPO errors also occurred when the agency did not correctly impose reductions or offset, misapplied exceptions or exemptions, or applied WEP but not GPO (or vice versa) for dually entitled beneficiaries.

On January 5, 2025, the Social Security Fairness Act of 2023 was signed into law, thereby repealing WEP/GPO. December 2023 was the last month WEP and GPO applied. This means that those rules no longer apply to benefits payable for January 2024 and later. The agency worked quickly and successfully to implement these changes. In April 2025, we began releasing higher monthly benefit payments. As of July 7, 2025, we completed sending over 3.1 million payments, totaling $17 billion, to beneficiaries eligible under the Social Security Fairness Act. The average retroactive payment was $7,208. As of September 30, 2025, we have taken over 387,000 new initial claims. We anticipate the WEP/GPO repeal will significantly reduce and eventually eliminate WEP/GPO improper payments in future years.

Our greatest payment accuracy challenges occur within the SSI program. SSI is a means-tested program for individuals with limited income and resources who are blind, disabled, or aged. Administering the SSI program is complicated by the statutory requirement for us to determine SSI eligibility and calculate SSI payments monthly. We generally make SSI payments on the first day of the month for eligibility in that month. Many factors impact SSI payment accuracy. Even if a payment was correct when paid, subsequent changes in that month can affect the payment due, resulting in either an overpayment or underpayment. Thus, the program requirements sometimes make improper payments inevitable. Improper payments often occur if recipients or their representative payees fail to timely report changes in any of their eligibility factors (e.g., an increase of their resources or a change in their wages). Failure to report changes is the primary cause of both overpayments and underpayments.

Based on our FY 2024 stewardship reviews (FY 2025 stewardship information will be available in summer 2026), we estimate that we paid approximately $63.3 billion to SSI recipients. Of that total, we estimate about $6.3 billion were overpayments, representing approximately 10.03 percent of outlays. We estimate that underpayments during this same period were $982.4 million, the equivalent of approximately 1.55 percent of outlays. In the prior year reporting, based on our FY 2023 stewardship reviews, we estimate that we paid approximately $61.0 billion to SSI recipients. Of that total, we estimate about $5.6 billion were overpayments, representing approximately 9.18 percent of outlays. We estimate that underpayments during this same period were $877.9 million, the equivalent of approximately 1.44 percent of outlays. When comparing prior year reporting to this year’s reporting, there has been an increase in estimated overpayments ($5.6 billion to $6.3 billion) and underpayments ($877.9 million to $982.4 million) in the SSI program.

Of the estimated $6.3 billion in SSI overpayments, approximately $5.7 billion was due to factors outside of the agency’s control because the data or information to validate payment accuracy prior to making payment does not exist or is inaccessible to us. The primary cause of these overpayments is reliance on timely self-reporting of financial accounts over the countable resource limit and employment and wage information. In field office reception areas, we are displaying reminders on television to highlight the importance of reporting when account balances exceed resource limits and to explain how to report wages, ensuring individuals receive the correct payment amount. We use the AFI tool with an individual’s consent, to identify and verify bank account information and detect undisclosed bank account balances with participating financial institutions. In August 2025, we implemented a zero-dollar AFI tolerance for SSI 65+ aged claim allowances before adjudicating to payment. In FY 2026, we intend to implement a zero-dollar AFI tolerance to all SSI initial claim allowances contingent upon funding the additional volume of AFI requests. This strategy mandates that AFI verification is fully completed prior to adjudication and before payments are issued, thereby eliminating improper payments at the source rather than pursuing recovery after the fact. We will continue to explore expanding AFI usage in post entitlement situations.

In general, to address the root causes due to factors outside of agency’s control, we conduct quality reviews and cost-effective program integrity work including SSI non-medical redeterminations. We take additional actions to conduct outreach to the public such as airing educational information on televisions in field office reception areas, communications with advocates, and posting reminders and resources on social media. We also seek data exchanges with government and private sector partners, such as PIE, discussed in the following paragraph.

To help mitigate both DI and SSI improper payments related to wages, we developed a new wage reporting option where we receive wage and employment information from a payroll data provider through an automated PIE. On December 31, 2024, we published the final rule, and on April 7, 2025, we began phased implementation with the initial exchange of 1 million Social Security numbers (SSN). We gradually increased the exchanges each month until reaching full implementation of approximately 10.7 million SSNs in September 2025. We continue monthly exchanges with the full authorized population after September. As part of the implementation activities, we provided training to technicians, updated our policies and instructions, and released communication to the public.

In the FY 2024 PIIA report, OIG included a recommendation that the agency complete the Foreign Travel Data (FTD) project. FTD is an agency application with direct access to the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Arrival and Departure Information System with travel information that if the agency maximizes its use, will further uncover unreported U.S. absences that affect SSI eligibility; thus, increasing the detection of improper payments. Effective January 2026, we are expanding the use of FTD to citizens for redeterminations and during initial claims, before SSI payments are made in certain situations, and non-citizens during initial claims, before SSI payments are made, in all cases. We are engaging with DHS’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to discuss the viability of establishing an automated data exchange to receive FTD and finish the exchange project in early FY 2027.

Approximately $599.1 million in SSI overpayments were within the agency’s control and due to our failure to access data or information to validate payment accuracy prior to making a payment. The primary causes of these overpayments are incorrectly computing the payment or failure to obtain or act on available information affecting the payment. We are addressing this root cause by investing in information technology modernization to provide our employees with user-friendly systems and tools. To meet the challenges of our growing workloads and provide the best service possible, we are streamlining our policies and procedures, issuing reminders to technicians, and automating more of our business processes.

We implemented IPASs to focus on our corrective actions to address improper payments in the OASI, DI, and SSI programs. As part of our IPAS, we identify and evaluate the effectiveness of each completed mitigation initiative. Additionally, we determine the most cost-effective strategies to remediate the underlying causes of payment errors and monitor, measure, and revise the strategies as needed. Since FY 2021, we have completed IPASs on 11 areas of improper payment deficiency. Two of the 11 IPASs were completed in FY 2025 on OASDI computations and relationship/dependency. In FY 2026, we will continue monitoring completion of outstanding and new corrective actions and estimate reduction impacts, where possible.

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Agency level Payment Integrity results

  • Payment accuracy rate

    (Based on federal funding spent by programs determined by agencies as susceptible to improper payments)

  • Improper payments rate

    (Based on federal funding spent by programs determined by agencies as susceptible to improper payments)

  • Unknown payments rate

    (Based on federal funding spent by programs determined by agencies as susceptible to improper payments)

  • Social Security Administration improper payment estimates over time
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    Overpayment
    Underpayment
    Technically improper
    Unknown

Recovery information

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Overpayment amount identified for recapture
Overpayment amount recovered

Recovery of overpayments

Please note: Overpayment amounts recovered are reported in the year they were recovered, not the year they were identified. Therefore it is possible in some years to have a recovery rate greater than 100%.

Overpayment amount identified through recovery activities $10,860.0 M
Overpayment amount recovered through recovery activities $4,925.0 M
Recovery activities recovery rate 45.35 %

Why recovery audits are not cost effective in certain programs

We meet the recovery activities program requirements of the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 for our benefit programs. We have no plans to conduct payment recapture audits or contract for a private sector payment recapture auditing firm because of the complexity of the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), Disability Insurance (DI), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. We conducted extensive market research prior to deciding not to use external auditors. We solicited a request for information and received approximately 15 responses. We interviewed all of the respondents, who agreed that they could not match our benefit payments internal controls and audit mechanisms because of the complexity of our programs. The typical claims specialist (our principal benefits reviewer, authorizer and adjudicator position) receives an average of 13 weeks of training prior to entering the job and does not achieve journeyman status until they have been on the job for 2 years.

We have a comprehensive debt collection program. We collected $4.9 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2025 at an administrative cost of $0.07 on average, per dollar collected. To recover overpayments, we use internal debt collection techniques (i.e., payment withholding, billing, and follow up), as well as some external collection techniques authorized by the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 for OASI and DI debts and the Foster Care Independence Act of 1999 for SSI debts.

In March 2025, we resumed use of the Treasury Offset Program (TOP) after suspending it in March 2020 because of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. From March-September 2025, we collected approximately $60 million from those who were notified of TOP debt referral prior to program suspension. We resumed sending pre-offset notices for all delinquent debts incurred after March 2020, beginning in August 2025.

We have also begun to explore use of the Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) Centralized Receivables Service (CRS). CRS is a shared service provider that performs collection work for agencies.

We continue to make improvements in other aspects of our debt collection program. In addition to TOP and CRS, we are modernizing our payment stubs on all overpayment notices by adding electronic payment options. We are removing the option to pay by handwriting a credit card number and then mailing the stub. This emphasis on electronic forms of payment aligns with Executive Order 14247 and the Administration’s goal to streamline payment processes. Since implementation in FY 2021, we have collected over $480 billion through our electronic payment options, over $462 billion through Pay.gov and almost $18 billion through Online Bill Pay. These remittance channels now account for 9 percent of our total remittance activity.

Additionally, we changed the benefit withholding rate for OASDI overpayments to 50 percent. Beginning April 25, 2025, we informed overpaid individuals that we will begin recovering their overpayment by withholding 50 percent of their benefit amount. This rate replaces the previous benefit withholding rate of 10 percent that was implemented on March 25, 2024. If an individual was notified of an overpayment prior to April 25, 2025, they will retain the 10 percent withholding rate unless we notify them of a new overpayment. There will be limited exceptions to this change, such as when an overpayment resulted from fraud.

The Federal Government uses the reclamation process to recover benefit payments paid via direct deposit to the financial account of a beneficiary who died and is not entitled to the payment, became legally incapacitated, or who died before the date of the payment(s). To recover OASI, DI, and SSI payments from U.S. financial institutions, we must send reclamation requests within 120 days of the date we have actual or constructive knowledge of a beneficiary’s death or legal incapacity. A financial institution may protest a recovery of funds if we did not initiate the reclamation timely.

For administrative payments, our current recovery activities program is a proven cost-effective means for evaluating payment accuracy and identifying improper payments. In 2013, we contracted with a private sector recovery auditing firm on a contingency fee basis to review our administrative payments. The firm based its review on past industry experience of improper payment rates, and a cost/benefit analysis of transactions processed by type and dollars paid. Because of their minimal recovery, the auditors terminated the contract.

Intentional monetary loss improper payments are more commonly referred to as financial fraud and are overpayments that occur on purpose. This agency reported $143.25M of confirmed fraud in this reporting cycle.

Supplemental Information

We use the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) Do Not Pay (DNP) on a small scale to perform single searches to identify death records for beneficiaries. Death records that we obtain from DNP data sources serve as leads for administrative actions or, if indicators of potential fraud are present, referrals to our Office of Inspector General for investigation. As of September 30, 2025, we have retrieved death records from DNP for 222 beneficiaries with an estimated $10.5 million in combined losses in improper payments. As a result, we have posted $4.0 million in overpayments—funds that the agency is attempting to recoup—to these beneficiaries’ records.

We have access to the same data as DNP that is relevant to our programs, including the General Services Administration’s System for Award Management (SAM), the full file of the Social Security Administration’s death information (including state death data), and Prisoner Update Processing System (PUPS).

SAM: We comply with regulations to use the List of Excluded Individuals/Entities (LEIE), which accomplishes the same purpose as the Exclusions query via SAM.gov. From SAM.gov, we can verify through Entity Registrations if any person or organization is registered to do business with the Federal Government and determine a person or organization’s eligibility to do business with the Federal Government through a check of the Exclusions query. We continue to follow all policies prescribed in Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 9.4 – Debarment, Suspension, and Ineligibility.

As prescribed in our policy, the State disability determination services (DDS) offices are required to check the LEIE at least annually. LEIE includes the names of providers excluded from Federally funded health care programs. The DDS offices also verify medical licenses, credentials, and certifications with State medical boards.

Death Information: As of December 27, 2023, we have been providing DNP the full file of death information, which includes all death reports we receive from the States. The file of death information is created from our internal records (i.e., the Numident) and includes all death information that we process on a daily basis from acceptable reporters (e.g., States, funeral homes, and family members). The information includes decedent’s name, Social Security number, date of birth, and date of death. Section 801 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act authorizes us to provide DNP, on a reimbursable basis, the full file of death information for three years (i.e., until December 27, 2026).

Prisoner Information: To comply with the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, we collaborated with Treasury’s Bureau of Fiscal Service to provide state and local prisoner information. Since our PUPS is more complete than the data available via DNP (i.e., PUPS includes prisoner information verified by SSA), we use our internal data to verify incarceration.

The Working System has reduced/prevented improper payments:

The Working System strives to maintain accurate data. However, the past year, SSA has identified incorrect information in the Working System Weekly.

SSA was found non-compliant during the most recent PIIA compliance review.

Non-compliant programs:

Show full list of compliant programs Expand

Compliant programs:

  • Administrative Payments - Social Security Administration
  • Analyzing Relationships between Disability, Rehabilitation, and Work
  • Disability Insurance (DI)
  • Interventional Cooperative Agreement Program
  • Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI)
  • Social Security - Work Incentives Planning and Assistance Program
  • Social Security Research and Demonstration
  • Social Security State Grants for Work Incentives Assistance to Disabled Beneficiaries
  • Special Benefits for Certain World War II Veterans
  • Strengthening Protections for Social Security Beneficiaries

Actions recommended and planned to achieve compliance

The most recent Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) annual compliance audit was for fiscal year (FY) 2024. In FY 2024, we had two programs reporting estimates above the statutory threshold, our Old-Age and Survivors, Disability Insurance (OASDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. In the FY 2024 compliance audit, the Social Security OIG concluded the agency was compliant with 8 of 10 PIIA reporting requirements. OIG determined that for the SSI program, the agency did not (1) demonstrate improvements to payment integrity or reach a tolerable improper payment and unknown payment rate and (2) did not report an improper payment and unknown payment estimate of less than 10 percent. The FY 2024 compliance audit report stated, “While SSA has made progress implementing corrective actions for both programs, it still has work to do to address improper payments.”

The FY 2024 compliance audit report included the following recommendations for the agency: 1) Continue working on the recommendations from prior compliance reports, which included: finalize the Improper Payment Alignment Strategies (IPAS) for OASDI computations overpayment deficiency dollars; conduct a study to expand Access to Financial Institutions (AFI) searches between the SSI initial application and subsequent eligibility redeterminations; and complete the expansion study for AFI and assess the effectiveness of lowering the countable liquid resource tolerance to $0; 2) Complete the foreign travel data project; and 3) Finalize the IPAS for relationship and dependency overpayment deficiency dollars.

We implemented the IPAS to focus on our corrective actions to address improper payments in both the OASDI and SSI programs. As part of our IPAS, we identify the root causes and evaluate the effectiveness of each completed mitigation initiative. Additionally, we determine the most cost-effective strategies to remediate the underlying causes of payment errors and monitor, measure, and revise the strategies as needed. IPAS is the process that we use to obtain agency-wide engagement and agreement on actions needed to remedy improper payments issues. Since FY 2021, we have completed IPASs on 11 areas of deficiency, including the OASDI computations and relationship and dependency IPASs mentioned in OIG’s recommendations. In FY 2026, we will continue monitoring completion of outstanding and new corrective actions and estimate reduction impacts, where possible.

For the SSI program, of the estimated $6.3 billion in SSI overpayments, approximately $5.7 billion were due to factors outside of the agency’s control because the data or information to validate payment accuracy prior to making payment does not exist or is inaccessible to us. Failure to report changes is the primary cause of both overpayments and underpayments.

The majority of SSI improper payments are a result of unreported or untimely reporting of financial accounts, wages, and in-kind support and maintenance (ISM). To ensure individuals continue to meet all statutory and regulatory requirements to be eligible and to receive the correct SSI payment amount, we conduct annual SSI non-medical redeterminations (RZ) and limited issues (LI). To ensure the most cost-effective investment of agency resources, we use a predictive model to estimate the likelihood and magnitude of overpayments to select cases for discretionary RZs. In FY 2025, we processed over 2.4 million RZs and LIs, and in FY 2026, we plan to process 2.6 million RZs and LIs. We issued guidance and reminders to technicians to assist with RZ/LI processing throughout the fiscal year.

We routinely identify unreported financial accounts, wages, and ISM through the RZ and LI processes and also attempt to do so through the other mechanisms described below.

AFI verifies bank account information and detects undisclosed bank accounts with participating financial institutions and with the individual’s consent. We use AFI for SSI initial claims, pre-effectuation review contacts, and RZs when SSI applicants/recipients allege total liquid resources of $400 or more. When there is a resource-related diary present on an RZ or LI, we use AFI regardless of any liquid resource allegation. In August 2025, we implemented a zero-dollar AFI tolerance for SSI aged 65+ claim allowances before adjudicating to payment. In FY 2026, we intend to implement a zero-dollar AFI tolerance to all SSI initial claim allowances contingent upon updating the AFI contract and funding the additional volume of AFI requests. This strategy mandates that AFI verification is fully completed prior to adjudication and before payments are issued, thereby eliminating improper payments at the source rather than pursuing recovery after the fact. We will continue to explore expanding AFI usage in post entitlement situations and develop a systems enhancement to ensure that technicians run AFI in all instances required by policy.

An ABLE account is a special tax-advantaged savings account used by eligible individuals to pay for qualified disability expenses. The account is owned by the person with the disability, and they must have become disabled before age 26. Effective January 1, 2026, eligibility for ABLE accounts will expand to include individuals with a disability that began before age 46. Proper reporting and accounting of ABLE accounts are essential to ensure exclusions are applied correctly and that SSI payments are accurate. To influence understanding of ABLE accounts and encourage reporting of financial account information, in FY 2025, we aired educational content specific to SSI reporting responsibilities and ABLE accounts on televisions in field office reception areas. In March 2025, we also issued a reminder to technicians to avoid multiple postings of the same ABLE account and to ensure proper accounting of resources in ABLE accounts owned by recipients.

We developed a new wage reporting option where we receive wage and employment information from a payroll data provider through an automated payroll information exchange. On December 31, 2024, we published a final rule on accessing and using information from payroll data providers to reduce overpayments and underpayments and improve service to customers. On April 7, 2025, we completed an initial exchange of 1 million Social Security numbers (SSN). We gradually increased the exchanges each month until reaching full implementation of approximately 10.7 million SSNs in September 2025. We continued monthly exchanges with the full authorized population after September. As part of the implementation activities, we provided training to technicians, updated our policies and instructions, and released communication to the public.

FY 2025 was the first year of implementation of three new regulations relating to ISM that were intended, in part, to reduce the ISM-reporting burden on SSI applicants and recipients. On September 30, 2024, we implemented changes that included: (1) eliminating the requirement to provide detailed information about the value of food assistance received; (2) expanding the definition of a “public assistance household” by adding Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits to the list of public income-maintenance (PIM) programs and by requiring the receipt of a PIM payment for only one additional household member (other than the SSI applicant or recipient) instead of requiring the receipt of a PIM payment for every member of the household; and (3) expanding the rental subsidy exception nationwide to simplify our ISM rules and ensure uniform application of the policy. For item (2), a draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to rescind changes to the definition of a Public Assistance Household is pending review with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. The complexity of our ISM regulations has been consistently cited as a cause of improper SSI payments. These three final rules were part of the agency’s efforts to reevaluate and streamline our ISM regulations. We have updated policy and technician instructions relating to cases potentially impacted by these changes.

To further mitigate SSI improper payments, at the end of FY 2024, we awarded a contract to the National Association for Public Health Statistics and Information Systems (NAPHSIS) on the acquisition of historical state death data. We are working with NAPHSIS on a multi-year effort to retrieve death data for states not previously audited by OIG and prior to implementation of the Electronic Death Registration.

We will continue development of the Consolidated Claims Experience (CCE), a modernized user-friendly web-based application designed to centralize and streamline benefit claim processing actions, reduce training time for technicians, and provide a more intuitive approach for data collection and processing of OASDI and SSI claims. CCE will employ modernized and enhanced computation utilities that minimize manual tasks and help technicians identify entitlement and eligibility for all programs for which the claimant qualifies, in order to mitigate missed entitlements. The system introduces new and enhanced features not found in existing platforms, such as “More Info” links, talking points for users, and easy access to commonly used external resources. These improvements increase customer satisfaction by eliminating redundant information requests and reducing the need for technicians to recontact customers, improving the timeliness and accuracy of claims processing, enhancing efficiency, and reducing operating costs.

In September 2024, we released the 21st Century PolicyNet (21CPN), which replaced PolicyNet, the 20+ year-old software platform that contained multiple applications and hosted tens of thousands of pages of policy instructions. The overall goals of 21CPN are an improved user experience, process efficiencies for the author, publisher, and researcher roles; and improved searching capabilities, including the use of intelligent search. In FY 2025, we continued development and refinement of the system to expand functionality and improve user experience. We will continue these efforts in FY 2026.

In FY 2024, we published the revised Notice Language Clearance Process policy, which incorporates review and approval of notice language through the plain language and customer experience lenses. In FY 2025, we used this new policy to provide a plain language review of 22 notices. We are also actively working to simplify disability work-related forms to improve understanding and reduce the burden on our customers and their employers. In February 2025, we published a revised SSA-3033, Employee Work Questionnaire, and clarified policy and procedures for technicians developing subsidy for DI and SSI initial claims, and DI work continuing disability reviews. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approved the revised SSA-821 Work Activity Report in July 2025, which we published in September 2025. The revised SSA-820 Self-Employment Work Activity Report is currently pending OMB approval; we expect completion of the form in FY 2026.

In March 2024, we expanded to all field offices and workload support units nationwide the Upload Documents and eSignature services, which allows beneficiaries and recipients to submit and sign documents electronically based on a technician request. We completed various enhancements and expanded available forms throughout FYs 2024 and 2025. In March 2025, we expanded functionality to include a new customer-initiated option allowing customers to electronically submit certain forms to the agency without technician initiation. Following this, in June 2025, we further expanded the functionality to allow customer-initiated submissions of evidence. Customers can access Upload Documents through their my Social Security account or via a deep link on the SSA.gov webpage. This self-service approach empowers customers to initiate document uploads as soon as they recognize a need, eliminating delays caused by waiting for technician outreach. In FY 2026, we will continue to webify forms for a mobile friendly experience and increase the number of forms. We plan to expand customer-initiated submissions to allow individual representative payees to submit documents.

We developed the Supplemental Security Income Transaction Accuracy Review (STAR) to isolate and measure internal processing accuracy. STAR focuses the accuracy of non-medical adjudicative decisions in initial claims redeterminations, and limited issues and exclusively on field office compliance with documentation and developmental requirements found in the agency’s policies and procedures. STAR findings enhance our understanding of those improper payments that result directly from technician error and help identify potential recommendations for improvement. STAR is completed on a biennial basis. We completed the review of FY 2024 case samples and will publish the STAR report in December 2025. We have already begun work on the FY 2026 STAR reviews and plan to complete the case sample in December 2026.


Official(s) accountable for the progress of the agency coming into compliance

Chad Poist, Chief Risk Officer, is accountable for bringing the Supplemental Security Income program into compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019.


Accountability mechanism tied to the success of the official designated in leading the efforts to come Into compliance

We hold managers, program officials, and senior executives accountable for reducing improper payments. These employees’ annual performance plans reflect their responsibility to support efforts to maintain sufficient internal controls to prevent, detect, and recover improper payments and meet targets to reduce improper payments. In FY 2025, we revised the Manages Performance element to incorporate “Holding Employees Accountable” as a requirement for all managers and supervisors. To achieve a successful performance rating, managers and supervisors must now meet this standard.

Senior Executive performance plans must clearly align with organizational goals and objectives under the Results Driven Critical Element, and the performance levels in the performance requirements must reflect agency targets.

To further our focus on reducing improper payments, in fiscal year 2019, we established an Improper Payments Prevention Team, now the Improper Payments team. The team works with key agency stakeholders to develop Improper Payment Alignment Strategies that outline innovative and effective strategies to mitigate the root causes of improper payments. Additionally, the Chief-level Improper Payments Oversight Board (IPOB) is responsible for reviewing, approving, and implementing all improper payment initiatives. The Chief Risk Officer or their designee serves as the executive chair for the IPOB.


The agency made substantial changes to the methodology of the review conducted for risk for improper payments for the reporting cycle.

Program name When was the last improper payment risk assessment conducted? Likely to be susceptible to significant improper payments? Substantial changes made to the assessment methodology used for the reporting cycle
Administrative Payments - Social Security Administration 2025 No No Yes
Analyzing Relationships between Disability, Rehabilitation, and Work *
Disability Insurance (DI) 2025 No Yes
Interventional Cooperative Agreement Program *
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) 2025 No Yes
Social Security - Work Incentives Planning and Assistance Program 2025 No No Yes
Social Security Research and Demonstration *
Social Security State Grants for Work Incentives Assistance to Disabled Beneficiaries 2024 No No
Special Benefits for Certain World War II Veterans *
Strengthening Protections for Social Security Beneficiaries 2025 No No Yes
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 2025 No Yes

* Assessment year is not displayed because one or more of the following statements is true:

  1. Not required to conduct a risk assessment under the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019,
  2. Already assessed for improper payment risk under a different name in a prior reporting period, and/or
  3. New and planning to perform a risk assessment in the future.

For the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Supplemental Security Income programs, much of the overpayments occur outside of the agency’s control. However, we continue to find ways to influence change where possible and focus on mitigation strategies within our control.