Department of War
The Department of War (DoW) met the overarching intent of the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) as well as Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123, Appendix C.
The criticality of Payment Integrity points to its unrivaled role in effectively identifying, preventing, and recovering improper payments (IP). Thus, Payment Integrity remains a top leadership strategic priority. Beginning in FY 2023, OUSW(C) initiated a tactical restructuring of payment integrity compliance for the DoW. This initiative categorized programs to present high-risk programs as standalone entities to specifically identify root causes for IP and increase compliance by reporting low-risk programs separately. The DoW established such distinction for three critical reasons: to enhance the accuracy and efficiency of reporting; to optimize DoW resource allocation; and to strive towards achieving full statutory compliance with the PIIA and adhere to OMB regulatory requirements. The DoW identifies and categorizes low-risk programs as Phase 1, thereby allowing the DoW to focus its efforts on detecting, preventing, and reducing improper payments (IP) and unknown payments (UP) on high-risk Phase 2 programs. This tactical restructuring initiative is still in its beginning DoW-wide stages in managing 49 distinct Programs, 41 of which are in Phase 1 and 8 of which are in Phase 2.
Tactical Impact and Strategic Achievements
1. We are proud to announce that the DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) determined 11 newly established Phase 1 programs performed compliant Risk Assessments, thereby adequately concluding that the programs are likely to make IP below the statutory threshold. The proactive and granular compliance approach galvanizes DoW financial accountability. DoD OIG lauded the approach in its May 2025 audit report on DoW FY 2024 compliance with the PIIA.
2. Another successful output of DoW restructuring of the Payment Integrity Portfolio is bringing to light higher IP rates for individual programs that were previously unidentified as high-risk due to being combined with low-risk programs. This enables the DoW to drill down on root causes and enforce component accountability.
3. The restructuring effort was key to identifying the higher risk Phase 2 programs for the first time in 6 years since the inception of the PIIA and even its predecessor laws. The strategic restructuring has also yielded decisive and quantifiable program-level PIIA compliance, year over year:
• FY 2022 – 25%
• FY 2023 – 50%
• FY 2024 – 79%
4. Conversely, this DoW strategy has decreased the overall Agency level compliance criteria from 5 out of 6 in 2024, to 4 out of 6 in 2025. This decrease is derived from losing the previous compliance with the Risk Assessment criteria because not all of the submitted Risk Assessments were deemed successful in adequately determining the inherent risk. The DoD OIG determined in its report DODIG-2025-105, “Audit of the Department of Defense’s FY 2024 Compliance with Payment Integrity Information Act Requirements,” issued May 27, 2025, that the DoW successfully met 4 out of 6 PIIA compliance criteria. To achieve full PIIA compliance, the DoW has adopted two strategic paths, incorporating the OMB Circular A-123, Appendix C, Phase 1 (Risk Assessments) and Phase 2 (Sampling & Estimation) approaches. Four Phase 1 Risk Assessments were deemed non-compliant:
a. DoD Travel Pay Navy–DTS was moved back to Phase 2 for FY 2026. When the Navy determined its DTS program was low-risk, it relied on a previous non-compliant IP and UP estimate that exceeded the statutory threshold.
b. Three Defense Health Agency (DHA) Phase 1 Risk Assessments were deemed non-compliant with the PIIA due to insufficient substantiation for the estimate, third party internal controls, and the potential impact of other audit agency findings. DHA and the DoD OIG resolved the open recommendations by agreeing that DHA will adjust the information presented within the Risk Assessments to more clearly connect the risks in the program with their associated oversight actions and internal controls, to ensure ease of understanding and clear crosswalk of the information as a best practice and to comply with DoD OIG recommendations. Those Risk Assessments will be completed and resubmitted to the DoD OIG in FY 2026.
5. The continued advancements of the DoW restructuring of the Payment Integrity Portfolio in FY 2024 included a consideration of the results from previous DoD OIG audit findings as well as a strategic assimilation of the recommendations from interagency lessons learned.
6. The DoW Phase 2 Programs identified $241,688.7 million in payments or outlays subject to testing under the PIIA and a decomposition is presented in Table 1 below. To test more high-risk payment samples, the DoW employed a statistical methodology recommended by the DoD OIG to develop FY 2025 IP and UP results.
Table 1. Payments or Outlays Subject to Testing
Type Rate Amount
Proper Payment 99.13% $239,583.2 million
Improper Payment 0.72% $1,737.0 million
Technically improper 0.47% $1,138.8 million
Underpayments 0.20% $482.5 million
Overpayments 0.05% $115.8 million
Unknown Payment 0.15% $368.4 million
7. DoW has published rates that exceeded the 10 percent compliance criteria on three out of eight Phase 2 Programs, serving as a key antecedent in clearly identifying DoW high-risk payment programs. This is instrumental in implementing targeted corrective actions. This decisively supports the main emphasis of Payment Integrity in ensuring accurate and timely proper payments. The three DoW Phase 2 programs that exceeded the 10 percent IP and UP threshold contributing factors and corrective actions are detailed below.
a. DoD Travel Pay Army–DTS: In FY 2025, the DoW reported an estimated proper payment rate of 88.77 percent ($2,248.6 million) and a combined IP and UP rate of 11.23 percent ($284.6 million).
i. This condition occurred because Army travelers, reviewing officials, and authorizing officials/certifying officers did not conduct a comprehensive review of every DTS voucher for their Command to ensure it contained the substantiating documentation and valid receipts to support the expenses for their official government travel. Specifically, approving and certifying officials approved travel vouchers for reimbursement without key supporting documentation resulting in overpayments and overpayments to travelers claiming incorrect amounts and erroneous mileage reimbursements.
ii. Planned Corrective Actions: The Army has developed a robust and anticipatingly effective corrective action plan centered on ensuring the tone at the top of the Army Commands is geared towards achieving OMB regulatory thresholds by ensuring Command emphasis, perpetual collaboration, and targeted training to reduce improper and unknown payments.
b. DoD Travel Pay ODO–DTS: In FY 2025, the DoW reported an estimated proper payment rate of 89.01 percent ($369.4 million) and a combined IP and UP rate of 10.99 percent ($45.6 million).
i. The bulk of the IPs is attributed to the technically improper payment errors which were derived from invalid DTS authorizations such as traveling prior to specified date, or invalid travel receipts that had missing critical information or were not in the proper format. UPs projected 3.60 percent ($15.0 million) and were identified where payments that were awaiting corrective action by the traveler or approving official and therefore unable to be determined if the payment was proper or not. Overpayment error projection was 1.73 percent ($7.2 million) and underpayment error projection was 0.11 percent ($0.5 million). These were associated with per diem rates such as meals and mileage being over/under paid.
ii. Planned Corrective Actions: The DoW is pursuing three separate corrective action plans aligned to the DoW Components with the highest rates contributing to the overall ODO improper and unknown payments. These targeted corrective actions will synchronize training and necessary policy updates, revising operational procedures and creating accountability mechanisms.
c. DoD Travel Pay ODO–IATS: In FY 2025, the DoW reported an estimated proper payment rate of 86.95 percent ($12.80 million) and a combined IP and UP rate of 13.05 percent ($1.9 million).
i. Processors made calculation errors based on incorrect rates, missing supporting documentation, and/or reimbursed unauthorized entitlements. These errors were due to the complex nature of the DoD Travel Pay ODO–IATS workload, high turnover rate for voucher examiners, and challenging production performance standards.
ii. The primary IP driver was identified as a combination of overpayments and underpayments resulting from calculation errors (wrong rate used to compute), missing proper supporting documentation, and/or processing oversight (entitlement paid that was not authorized).
iii. Planned Corrective Actions: To improve accuracy and efficiency in travel payment processing, management is implementing several key initiatives. These include launching an “Audit the Auditor” process with a defined performance standard and supporting checklist to proactively detect and address errors; conducting “back-to-basics” training on common error types; exploring eLearning modules for travel pay processing; establishing recurring meetings with personnel to emphasize proper claim submission procedures; and deploying the SmartVoucher tool for Temporary Duty (TDY) claims and Civilian Permanent Change of Station (PCS) claims, providing built-in validation to minimize submission errors.
8. The Civilian Pay–Army and Military Pay Army–National Guard programs demonstrated strong performance in FY 2024, reporting IP and UP estimates and rates well below the statutory threshold. Of note, the DoW has made a strategic decision not to report IP or UP estimates for these programs in FY 2025. DoW will move these two Programs to Phase 1 reporting in FY 2026, in which they will each complete an IP risk assessment in FY 2026. OMB and DoD OIG concurred with this decision.
9. DoW has dedicated considerable effort to identify $1,369.46 million in monetary losses, successfully recapturing $1,284.86 million through its Payment Recovery Audits and Activities program. This achievement underscores the DoW’s commitment to proper stewardship of funding and demonstrates the effectiveness of its recovery initiatives.
Agency level Payment Integrity results
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Payment accuracy rate
(Based on federal funding spent by programs determined by agencies as susceptible to improper payments)
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Improper payments rate
(Based on federal funding spent by programs determined by agencies as susceptible to improper payments)
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Unknown payments rate
(Based on federal funding spent by programs determined by agencies as susceptible to improper payments)
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Department of War improper payment estimates over time
View as:
Chart toggle amounts:Proper paymentsOverpaymentUnderpaymentTechnically improperUnknown
Recovery information
Please note: Overpayment amounts recovered are reported in the year they were recovered, not the year they were identified. Therefore it is possible in some years to have a recovery rate greater than 100%.
| Overpayment amount identified through recovery audits | $1,369.46 M |
| Overpayment amount recovered through recovery audits | $1,284.86 M |
| Recovery audit recovery rate | 93.82 % |
Conditions giving rise to improper payments identified in recovery audits, how those conditions are being resolved, and the methods used to recover those payments
The DoW Payment Recovery Audit (PRA) program is the Department’s overall plan for risk analysis and the performance of payment recovery audits. PRAs are reviews and analyses of program accounting and financial records, supporting documentation, and other pertinent information supporting its payments; and it is designed specifically, to identify overpayments. It is through this system of internal controls surrounding the payments that assists in resolving the erroneous non-intentional monetary loss of Department dollars. The Department also utilizes collaborative working groups and enhanced specific reports that are disseminated to the responsible DoW Component for the identification, validation, and potential corrective actions for the trends of overpayment types, if necessary.
| Recovery audit amount identified this reporting period that remains outstanding | $260.31 M | ||||
| Recovery audit amount rate outstanding | 1.25 % | ||||
| Recovery audit amount this reporting period that remains outstanding for 0-6 months | $168.02 M | ||||
| Recovery audit amount identified this reporting period that remains outstanding for 6 months to 1 year | $92.29 M | ||||
| Recovery audit amount identified in this reporting period determined not collectible during this reporting period | $17.06 M | ||||
| Recovery audit rate identified in this reporting period determined not collectible during this reporting period | 1.25 % | ||||
Justification for the Determination that the recovery audit amount is not collectable
The determination that certain improper payments identified in recovery audits are deemed uncollectable is based on specific, justified circumstances. The Department's uncollectable amounts are primarily attributed to authorized forgiven amounts by Military Commanders or Senior Executive Leaders for individual Service Members, Civilians, or Veterans. These forgiveness actions are predicated on overarching reasons such as debt processing errors, Veteran Affairs waivers, erroneous payments, documented financial hardship, demonstrable injustice, and situations involving deceased Service Members. Furthermore, overpayments involving vendors who have filed for bankruptcy are also deemed unlikely to be recovered and are therefore classified as uncollectable. The unrecoverable amount indicated for Military Pay programs is a factor of Pay Entry Base Date (PEBD) adjustments performed at HQMC, M&RA, stemming from Officer Candidates (OCANs) assessed to the Platoon Leaders Course (PLC) Program. After the initial training increment, these OCANs were erroneously credited time for pay purposes while assigned to a holding Reporting Unit Code (RUC), and the PEBD was not adjusted accordingly, an error deemed not the fault of the Member and therefore written off.
Intentional monetary loss improper payments are more commonly referred to as financial fraud and are overpayments that occur on purpose. This agency reported $2,284.92M of confirmed fraud in this reporting cycle.
Supplemental Information
Within the Department of War (DoW), the Do Not Pay (DNP) database is used on a regular basis for the following payments: Military Health Benefits (issued by the Defense Health Agency; Commercial Pay and Retirement and Annuitant Pay(issued by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS)); and USACE (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) Commercial Pay (issued by USACE), comprising the majority of the payments issued by the Department. Amongst the three DoW agencies currently enrolled in DNP, the Department uses the online search, payment integration, and batch matching features of DNP on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis. The majority of the flagged payees are based on the Death Master File and the name match results from the rest of the DNP databases (e.g., System for Award Management). The Department researches all payments that are identified to be potentially improper.
Research has determined that the majority of these match results are false positives (e.g., a vendor’s tax identification number is matched to a deceased individual’s social security number, and the payment is erroneously flagged). The remaining matches are almost always deemed proper based on established business rules related to contracts terms and vendor performance (as payments cannot be stopped to vendors who performed properly under contractual agreements). The Department has historically adjudicated and deemed proper the vast majority potential improper payments identified using the DNP Portal. To date, the DNP initiative has not reduced the Department’s improper payments.
The Working System has not reduced/prevented improper payments:
The Working System strives to maintain accurate data. However, the past year, DOW has identified incorrect information in the Working System Weekly.
DOW was found non-compliant during the most recent PIIA compliance review.
Non-compliant programs:
- Civilian Pay – Army
- Civilian Pay – Other Defense Organization (ODO)
- Commercial Pay – Navy Enterprise and Resource Planning (NERP)
- Military Health Benefits – TRICARE East Region Program (East)
- Military Health Benefits – TRICARE Medicare Eligible Program (TMEP)
- Military Health Benefits – TRICARE West Region Program (West)
- Military Pay Army – National Guard
- Travel Pay Army – Defense Travel System (DTS)
- Travel Pay Department of Air Force (DAF) - Reserve Travel System (RTS)
- Travel Pay Navy – Defense Travel System (DTS)
Show full list of compliant programs
Compliant programs:
- Civilian Pay – Department of Air Force (DAF)
- Civilian Pay – Navy
- Commercial Pay - U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)
- Commercial Pay – Computerized Accounts Payable System (CAPS/ CAPS-W)
- Commercial Pay – Defense Agencies Initiative (DAI)
- Commercial Pay – Defense Enterprise Accounting Management System (DEAMS)
- Commercial Pay – Enterprise Business System (EBS)
- Commercial Pay – Financial Accounting and Budgetary System (FABS)
- Commercial Pay – General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS)
- Commercial Pay – Integrated Accounts Payable System (IAPS)
- Commercial Pay – Mechanization of Contract Administration Services (MOCAS)
- Commercial Pay – ONEPAY
- Commercial Pay – Standard Automated Voucher Examination System (SAVES)
- Commercial Pay – Transportation Financial Management System (TFMS)
- Military Health Benefits – Administrative
- Military Health Benefits – TRICARE Overseas Program (TOP)
- Military Health Benefits – TRICARE Pharmacy Program (TPharm)
- Military Pay Army – Active Duty
- Military Pay Army – Reserve
- Military Pay Department of Air Force (DAF) – Active Duty
- Military Pay Department of Air Force (DAF) – Air National Guard
- Military Pay Department of Air Force (DAF) – Reserve
- Military Pay Marie Corps – Reserve
- Military Pay Marine Corps – Active Duty
- Military Pay Navy – Active Duty
- Military Pay Navy – Reserve
- Military Retirement – Annuitant Pay
- Military Retirement – Combat Related Special Compensation
- Military Retirement – Retired Pay
- NSA Grants
- Travel Pay - U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)
- Travel Pay Army – Integrated Automated Travel System (IATS)
- Travel Pay Department of Air Force (DAF) – Defense Travel System (DTS)
- Travel Pay Marine Corps - MARINE CORPS TOTAL FORCE SYSTEM (MCTFS)
- Travel Pay Marine Corps – Defense Travel System (DTS)
- Travel Pay Marine Corps – Integrated Automated Travel System (IATS)
- Travel Pay Navy – Integrated Automated Travel System (IATS)
- Travel Pay Other Defense Organization (ODO) – Defense Travel System (DTS)
- Travel Pay Other Defense Organization (ODO) – Integrated Automated Travel System (IATS)
Actions recommended and planned to achieve compliance
The OIG concluded that the "Department did not demonstrate a sound methodology for identifying all programs required to report for PIIA compliance, and it did not effectively support its risk determinations for four programs. The OIG recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD, develop and implement a tool to improve oversight of programs, including a method for establishing new programs and determining their establishment dates." They also recommended that the Director of the Defense Health Agency "reassess noncompliant risk assessments and document and support the information relied on, including the controls." The OIG also made a recommendation to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller) to "reevaluate the DoD Travel Pay Navy–Defense Travel System program and report the program’s estimate in the appropriate PIIA reporting phase."
The OIG also concluded that the "Department published unreliable estimates for six programs because it has not developed a methodology for identifying a complete universe of payment transactions for each of its programs. This resulted in unreliable estimates and non-compliance with the PIIA. The OIG "recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD, in coordination with DoD Components, develop and implement a methodology to identify all DoD outlays and the programs with which they are associated, and to verify that the programs' universes of payment transactions include all outlays related to each respective program."
To achieve full PIIA compliance across multiple programs, the Department is primarily targeting a FY2026-FY2028 timeframe. The main strategy is to address the root causes of improper payments using enhanced training, process improvements, system changes, and increased oversight. A key goal is to improve data accuracy and ensure that policies and procedures within the Defense Travel System (DTS) and other payment systems are followed.
• Enhanced training and accountability include implementing mandatory training for Approving Officials (AOs) and travel personnel, tracking improper payments, and creating performance standards for auditors to improve accuracy and lower human error.
• Process standardization and internal control improvements involve creating standardized processes for handling payment reviews, clarifying roles and responsibilities, publishing standard operating procedures (SOPs), and implementing additional internal controls to prevent and lessen improper payments.
• System improvements and automation consist of deploying automated tools like "Smart Voucher" and AI data scrapes, implementing system change requests (SCRs) to improve data management, and using technology to streamline processes and lower manual errors.
• Collaboration and communication are fostered by encouraging cooperation with stakeholders, including DFAS, Branches of Service, and the OUSW(C) Payment Integrity Team, through regular communication and feedback loops to ensure effective implementation and ongoing improvement.
Key challenges are related to data universes, as the DoW's inability to develop a complete universe of payment transactions for accurate improper payment estimation remains a significant challenge. Specifically, for the current reporting period the Department’s Phase 2 program Universe of Transactions reconciliation between the entitlement and disbursement systems resulted in a greater than 99% reconciled population.
The Department's PIIA compliance efforts are focused on addressing the specific deficiencies identified by the DoD OIG and achieving sustainable improvements in payment integrity. Ongoing monitoring and adaptation of these plans, with particular attention to building more complete data universes and mitigating risks associated with reliance on external entities, will be crucial for achieving and sustaining compliance and meeting OMB statutory thresholds. The development of a Department-wide tool for program oversight will be essential in ensuring that all programs are identified and properly assessed for PIIA compliance. Additionally, the Department has developed robust corrective action plans for each Phase 2 program that will target the areas contributing to the improper and unknown payment root causes attributed to the projected rates.
Official(s) accountable for the progress of the agency coming into compliance
Thomas W. Harker, SES
Deputy Chief Financial Officer
Office of the Under Secretary of War (Comptroller)
Accountability mechanism tied to the success of the official designated in leading the efforts to come Into compliance
Pursuant to the January 20, 2025, Presidential Memorandum entitled “Restoring Accountability for Career Senior Executives” and consistent with the President’s direction U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) established new Senior Executive Service (SES) performance plans that all agencies must adopt beginning with the FY 2026 performance cycle. The “Faithful Administration of the Law and the President’s Policies” critical performance element has the highest weighted rating. Part of implementing these new directives that DoW mandates additional performance requirements specific to Financial Improvement and Audit Remediation (FIAR) standards.
SES members within the Secretary of War with ownership of the financial statement audit priorities will include specific performance requirements aligned to one or more of the annual audit priorities in their Achieving Organizational Goals critical elements. These requirements articulate specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time-based performance measures that will support each organizational performance goal. As an example “Supports the annual financial statement audit by accelerating the path to an unmodified audit opinion.” SES members with a direct role must comply with the policies and regulations, implement internal control procedures, document transactions, submit auditor-requested materials timely, remediate high risk/priority material weaknesses, develop/update audit roadmaps and drive remediation strategy and plans targeted at achieving an unmodified opinion. They further direct continuous process and internal control improvements, identifies root cause(s) of issues and sustains up-to-date system internal controls. Additionally, SES members are accountable for driving government efficiencies within their organization to streamline proficiencies, quality work and cost-effective use of government resources. SES members with an indirect role must implement timely, effective and measurable corrective actions plans and maintain key supporting documentation to substantiate financial transactions to ensure their workforce is properly trained on their business effectiveness and are held accountable. All of which either directly and/or indirectly equips the DoW with the inherent ability and organizational leadership structure to achieve compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act.
| Program name | When was the last improper payment risk assessment conducted? | Likely to be susceptible to significant improper payments? | Substantial changes made to the assessment methodology used for the reporting cycle |
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| Civilian Pay – Army | 2024 |
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| Civilian Pay – Department of Air Force (DAF) | 2025 |
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| Civilian Pay – Navy | 2024 |
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| Civilian Pay – Other Defense Organization (ODO) | 2025 |
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| Commercial Pay – Computerized Accounts Payable System (CAPS/ CAPS-W) | * | ||
| Commercial Pay – Defense Agencies Initiative (DAI) | * | ||
| Commercial Pay – Defense Enterprise Accounting Management System (DEAMS) | * | ||
| Commercial Pay – Enterprise Business System (EBS) | 2025 |
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| Commercial Pay – Financial Accounting and Budgetary System (FABS) | 2025 |
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| Commercial Pay – General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS) | 2025 |
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| Commercial Pay – Integrated Accounts Payable System (IAPS) | 2025 |
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| Commercial Pay – Mechanization of Contract Administration Services (MOCAS) | 2025 |
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| Commercial Pay – Navy Enterprise and Resource Planning (NERP) | * | ||
| Commercial Pay – ONEPAY | 2025 |
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| Commercial Pay – Standard Automated Voucher Examination System (SAVES) | 2025 |
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| Commercial Pay – Transportation Financial Management System (TFMS) | 2025 |
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| Commercial Pay - U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) | 2025 |
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| Military Health Benefits – Administrative | 2023 |
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| Military Health Benefits – TRICARE East Region Program (East) | 2024 |
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| Military Health Benefits – TRICARE Medicare Eligible Program (TMEP) | 2024 |
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| Military Health Benefits – TRICARE Overseas Program (TOP) | 2024 |
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| Military Health Benefits – TRICARE Pharmacy Program (TPharm) | 2024 |
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| Military Health Benefits – TRICARE West Region Program (West) | 2024 |
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| Military Pay Army – Active Duty | 2025 |
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| Military Pay Army – National Guard | 2024 |
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| Military Pay Army – Reserve | 2025 |
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| Military Pay Department of Air Force (DAF) – Active Duty | 2025 |
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| Military Pay Department of Air Force (DAF) – Air National Guard | 2025 |
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| Military Pay Department of Air Force (DAF) – Reserve | 2025 |
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| Military Pay Marie Corps – Reserve | 2024 |
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| Military Pay Marine Corps – Active Duty | 2024 |
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| Military Pay Navy – Active Duty | 2024 |
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| Military Pay Navy – Reserve | 2024 |
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| Military Retirement – Annuitant Pay | 2025 |
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| Military Retirement – Combat Related Special Compensation | 2025 |
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| Military Retirement – Retired Pay | 2025 |
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| NSA Grants | * | ||
| Travel Pay - U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) | 2023 |
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| Travel Pay Army – Defense Travel System (DTS) | 2025 |
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| Travel Pay Army – Integrated Automated Travel System (IATS) | * | ||
| Travel Pay Department of Air Force (DAF) – Defense Travel System (DTS) | 2025 |
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| Travel Pay Department of Air Force (DAF) - Reserve Travel System (RTS) | 2024 |
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| Travel Pay Marine Corps – Defense Travel System (DTS) | 2024 |
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| Travel Pay Marine Corps – Integrated Automated Travel System (IATS) | 2025 |
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| Travel Pay Marine Corps - MARINE CORPS TOTAL FORCE SYSTEM (MCTFS) | 2024 |
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| Travel Pay Navy – Defense Travel System (DTS) | 2024 |
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| Travel Pay Navy – Integrated Automated Travel System (IATS) | 2024 |
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| Travel Pay Other Defense Organization (ODO) – Defense Travel System (DTS) | 2025 |
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| Travel Pay Other Defense Organization (ODO) – Integrated Automated Travel System (IATS) | 2025 |
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* Assessment year is not displayed because one or more of the following statements is true:
- Not required to conduct a risk assessment under the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019,
- Already assessed for improper payment risk under a different name in a prior reporting period, and/or
- New and planning to perform a risk assessment in the future.